

**REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**  
**MINISTRY OF TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE**  
**AVIATION ACCIDENT AND SERIOUS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION**



**ANNUAL SAFETY REVIEW**  
**OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**  
**YEAR 2025**

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**RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS**

<b>Revision Number</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Subject</b>
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## **FOREWORD**

The Republic of Armenia, as a Contracting State to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, shall ensure compliance with the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

In accordance with the obligations arising from Annex 2 of the EU–Armenia Common Aviation Area Agreement, the Republic of Armenia has incorporated into its national legal framework the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis, and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation (EU Reg. 376/2014).

The provisions of EU Reg. 376/2014 were initially transposed by Order No. 451-L of the Chair of the Civil Aviation Committee of the Republic of Armenia, dated 22 September 2022, entitled “On Establishing Regulation Laying Down the Reporting, Analysis and Follow-Up of Occurrences in Civil Aviation of the Republic of Armenia” (Order No. 451-L).

Subsequently, Order No. 451-L was repealed and replaced by Order No. 21-N of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia, dated 2 September 2025, entitled “Regulation on Civil Aviation Occurrence Reporting, Analysis, Follow-Up, and Safety Data Management” (Order No. 21-N), which currently governs the relevant legal framework.

In line with Point 11 of the EU Reg. 376/2014, each Member State shall publish a safety review at least once a year in order to inform the public of the level of safety in civil aviation.

The safety review shall:

- 1) contain aggregated and anonymised information on the type of occurrences and safety-related information reported through its national mandatory and voluntary reporting systems;
- 2) identify trends;
- 3) identify the action it has taken.

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According to Point 3.11 of the Charter of the Aviation Accidents and Serious Incidents Investigation Division (AASIID) of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia, AASIID is responsible for issuing the annual safety review.

Data in this document are subject to change as ongoing investigations are completed. This review is prepared using Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) data collected in accordance with Order No 21-N which is compliant with EU Reg. 376/2014. Data are collected from MORs that have been reported to the CAC and have occurred in or outside the Armenia involving Armenian registered aircraft.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AASIID</b>	Aviation Accidents and Serious Incidents Investigation Division
<b>ADREP</b>	Accident/Incident Data Reporting
<b>CNS</b>	Communications/Navigation/Surveillance
<b>AOC</b>	Air Operator Certificate
<b>ATA</b>	Air Transport Association
<b>ATM</b>	Air Traffic Management
<b>CAC</b>	Civil Aviation Committee of the Republic of Armenia
<b>CAST</b>	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
<b>CAT</b>	Commercial Air Transport
<b>CICTT</b>	CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
<b>EASA</b>	European Union Aviation Safety Agency
<b>ECCAIRS</b>	European Co-ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems
<b>EPAS</b>	European Plan for Aviation Safety
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>ICAO</b>	International Civil Aviation Organization
<b>MOR</b>	Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
<b>SCF-NP</b>	System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
<b>(SCF-PP)</b>	System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant)
<b>SARPs</b>	Standards and Recommended Practices
<b>SIB</b>	Safety Information Bulletin
<b>SPIs</b>	Safety performance indicators

## GLOSSARY

**Occurrence report:** means a collection of values and a description that describe an occurrence.

**Incident:** means an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

**Serious incident:** means an incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident and is associated with the operation of an aircraft, which in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down.

**Accident:** means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:

- a. a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
  - being in the aircraft, or,
  - direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or,
  - direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
- b. the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a single engine, (including its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing

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gear doors, windscreens, the aircraft skin (such as small dents or puncture holes) or minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike, (including holes in the radome); or

- c. the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

**Investigation:** means a process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes and/or contributing factors and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.

**Just culture:** means a culture in which front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.

**MOR:** means mandatory occurrence reports, reporting safety-related events which are reported to the Civil Aviation Committee (CAC) which relate to incidents considered as reportable.

**Safety issue:** means safety deficiencies related to one or more hazards. They are the actual manifestation of a hazard or a combination of several hazards in a specific context.

**Safety recommendation:** means a proposal of an accident investigation authority based on information derived from an investigation, made with the intention of preventing accidents or incidents and which in no case has the purpose of creating a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. In addition to safety recommendations arising from accident and incident investigations, safety recommendations may result from diverse sources, including safety studies.

**State Safety Programme:** means an integrated set of legal acts and activities aimed at managing civil aviation safety in the RA.

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The Annual Safety Review of the Republic of Armenia provides an overview of the Civil Aviation safety data of 2025 and includes comparisons to similar data mostly from the 2023-2025 period.

The content and analysis of this report is based on data extracted from the occurrence reporting system and as required by Order No 14-L of the Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia “On establishing State Safety Programme” dated 26 February 2021; as well as by Order No 21-N.

The data are presented as an additional tool for aviation stakeholders and the public to provide a snapshot of the safety levels of civil aviation in the Republic of Armenia and to present the main safety issues identified through analysis and information from European (EASA) and global (ICAO) sources.

## **2. OCCURRENCE REPORTING**

The occurrence reporting system aims to improve aviation safety by ensuring the relevant safety information related to civil aviation is reported, collected, stored, protected, exchanged, disseminated and analysed. The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the proactive role in the prevention and analysis of accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability.

The information collected is adequately protected from unauthorized use or disclosure, and it is used strictly for the purpose of maintaining and improving aviation safety.


Occurrence reporting is one of the active systems that contributes towards identifying safety-related issues and help develop proactive approaches and strategies to mitigate undesired outcomes while enhancing overall aviation safety.

In 2023, 2024 and 2025 there is a significant increase in the number of occurrences reported and submitted to the national database (Chart 1) as compared with year 2022. The increase can be attributed to the following main drivers:

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- the transposition of an EU-wide legal framework for mandatory reporting through EU Reg. 376/2014 into Order No. 451-L, subsequently into Order No 21-N,
- the update of State Safety Policy Statement,
- promotion of “just culture” and inspiring a safety reporting culture among aviation users, and;
- the continuous monitoring of the occurrence reports in the Republic of Armenia.



*Chart 1. Number of occurrences under MOR system (2022, 2023, 2024, 2025)*

In 2025, the total number of aircraft movements at Zvartnots International Airport reached 41,999, including 21,000 departures and 20,999 arrivals. This represents the operational exposure against which occurrence data should be assessed in line with risk-based safety management principles.

Based on a total of 305 reported occurrences, this corresponds to an approximate rate of **7.3 occurrences per 1,000 movements**, or **72.6 occurrences per 10,000 movements**.

In accordance with the principles of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS), the use of exposure-based indicators supports a more accurate assessment of safety performance by enabling risk-based analysis and comparability over time.

From an EPAS perspective, safety risk management should consider both the frequency of occurrences and the level of operational exposure. In this context, the observed occurrence rate indicates that the increase in absolute numbers is primarily driven by enhanced reporting practices and operational activity, rather than a deterioration in safety performance.


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This approach is consistent with EPAS objectives to strengthen data-driven decision-making, improve safety intelligence, and support proportionate and targeted mitigation actions.

### **Number of occurrences in comparison with the number of reports**

As shown in Chart 2, a total of 345 mandatory reports were received for 305 occurrences in 2025. This corresponds to a reporting ratio of approximately 1.13 reports per occurrence.



*Chart 2. Number of occurrences vs number of reports in 2025*

This indicates that, on average, each occurrence is reported by more than one source, reflecting a positive reporting culture and a good level of cross-reporting among stakeholders. Such redundancy enhances data reliability, improves the accuracy of occurrence analysis, and supports more robust safety assessments.

### **Sources of the Occurrence Reports**

The sources of the Occurrence Reports (Aircraft Operators; Aerodrome Operator; ATM/ANS, Maintenance organization; Others) submitted in 2023, 2024 and 2025 are shown in Chart 3. The same event may have been reported from multiple sources. In such cases, multiple reports are merged to reflect one occurrence.




Chart 3. Sources of the Occurrence Reports submitted in 2023, 2024 and 2025

### State/Area of Occurrence

According to the submitted occurrence reports, most of the occurrences happened in the Republic of Armenia, whereas only a small number occurred outside Armenia (Chart 4). It shall be noted that only 11 occurrences happened outside the Republic of Armenia in 2025 and only 2 occurrences are not related to the state of occurrence.





Chart 4. State of Occurrence

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**National vs International AOC holder**

Chart 5 illustrates the number of occurrences associated with aircraft operated by holders of national and international Air Operator Certificates (AOC). A total of 36 occurrences are attributed to aircraft operated by national AOC holders, while 255 occurrences are attributed to aircraft operated by international AOC holders. An additional 14 occurrences could not be attributed to a specific type of AOC holder.



*Chart 5. Occurrences related to national and international AOC holders*

The data shows that the majority of occurrences are associated with aircraft operated by international AOC holders. This reflects the higher exposure and operational volume of international operators within Armenian airspace, and highlights the importance of continued oversight and cooperation with foreign operators.

**Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operation**

The occurrence reports submitted in 2023, 2024 and 2025 relate to commercial air transport operations (passenger and cargo) involving aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5700 kg. Chart 6 shows the number of occurrences in 2023, 2024 and 2025 divided for category in the field of Commercial Aviation Transport.

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The type of operation indicates whether this was a passenger, cargo or other type of operation. Chart 6 indicates that the majority of the occurrences are related to transporting passengers.




Chart 6. Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operation

The predominance of passenger transport-related occurrences is consistent with the structure of commercial aviation activity, where passenger operations represent the largest share of traffic. This distribution indicates that safety monitoring should remain focused on passenger operations due to their higher exposure.

**Aircraft damage or personal injury-related events**

As illustrated in Chart 7, the majority of reported occurrences did not result in aircraft damage. In 2025, 301 occurrences involved no damage, while 1 occurrence resulted in minor damage and 3 occurrences resulted in substantial damage.

For comparison, 274 occurrences in 2023 and 268 occurrences in 2024 involved no damage.

The overwhelming majority of occurrences did not result in aircraft damage, indicating that most reported events are of low severity. This suggests that existing safety barriers and operational controls are generally effective in preventing escalation to more serious outcomes.

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


Chart 7. Aircraft damage related events in 2023, 2024, 2025

With regard to personal injury, no injury-related occurrences were reported in 2023, 2024, or 2025. This indicates that the vast majority of reported occurrences resulted in low-severity outcomes and did not pose a direct risk to human life or health.

From a safety performance perspective, this can be considered a positive indicator, suggesting effective risk mitigation and operational safety barriers within the aviation system.

However, it should also be noted that the absence of reported injuries may partially reflect underreporting of minor injuries or differences in reporting practices, particularly for events not meeting mandatory reporting thresholds.

In comparison with international trends, where minor injury-related occurrences are typically recorded at low but consistent levels, continued emphasis on comprehensive and accurate reporting remains essential to ensure full visibility of safety performance.

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### 3. OCCURRENCE CLASSIFICATION


Each occurrence report submitted to the national database is classified under:

- Accident
- Serious incident
- Incident
- Other Occurrence

Such classification is based on the ICAO ADREP (Accident/Incident Data Reporting) taxonomy guidance material and reference to the definitions deriving from Order No. 21-N.

In 2023 and 2024, a total of 276 and 270 mandatory occurrences, respectively, were reported to the CAC. In 2025, the number of reported mandatory occurrences increased to 305, as illustrated in Chart 8. The majority of occurrences reported under the mandatory reporting system are classified under the category of “Other occurrences.” This category encompasses event types aligned with EUROCONTROL terminology, including occurrences without safety effect.

The high proportion of occurrences classified as “Other occurrences” indicates that a significant number of events have limited or no direct safety impact. However, this also highlights the need for improved classification practices to enhance the analytical value of occurrence data.



**Chart 8. Number of Occurrences** reported under the mandatory reporting system 2023, 2024 and 2025

It should be noted that while occurrence classification is considered robust, certain elements of the analysis, including categorisation, event type allocation, and ATA chapter assignment, may be refined as additional information becomes available.

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#### 4. OCCURRENCE CATEGORIES

Occurrence categories, as developed by CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT), are used to classify occurrences at a high level to permit analysis of the data in support of safety initiatives. Each category has a unique name and identifier to permit common coding in accident/incident systems, a text definition, and usage notes to clarify the category and aid in coding occurrences.

The distribution of occurrence categories provides an overview of the main safety domains affecting operations. Variations between years may reflect changes in reporting practices, operational exposure, or emerging safety trends requiring further monitoring.

The categories presented in Chart 9 are based on the ICAO ADREP taxonomy and are provided as follows:

<i><b>Taxonomy abbreviation</b></i>	<i><b>Description</b></i>	<i><b>Taxonomy abbreviation</b></i>	<i><b>Description</b></i>
<b>ARC</b>	Abnormal Runway Contact	<b>LOC-G</b>	Loss of Control-Ground
<b>AMAN</b>	Abrupt Manoeuvre	<b>LOC-I</b>	Loss of Control-Inflight
<b>ADRM</b>	Aerodrome	<b>LOLI</b>	Loss of Lifting Conditions En-Route
<b>MAC</b>	Airprox/TCAS Alert/Loss of Separation/Near Mid-Air Collisions/Mid-Air Collisions	<b>LALT</b>	Low Altitude Operations
<b>ATM</b>	ATM/CNS	<b>MED</b>	Medical
<b>BIRD</b>	Bird strike	<b>NAV</b>	Navigation Errors
<b>CABIN</b>	Cabin Safety Events	<b>OTHR</b>	Other
<b>CTOL</b>	Collision with Obstacle(s) during Take-Off and Landing	<b>RE</b>	Runway Excursion
<b>CFIT</b>	Controlled Flight Into or Toward Terrain	<b>RI</b>	Runway Incursion
<b>EVAC</b>	Evacuation	<b>SEC</b>	Security related
<b>EXTL</b>	External Load Related Occurrences	<b>SCF-NP</b>	System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
<b>F-NI</b>	Fire/Smoke (non-impact)	<b>SCF-PP</b>	System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant)

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<b>F-POST</b>	Fire/Smoke (post-impact)	<b>TURB</b>	Turbulence Encounter
<b>FUEL</b>	Fuel related	<b>USOS</b>	Undershoot/Overshoot
<b>GTOW</b>	Glider Towing related events	<b>UIMC</b>	Unintended Flight in IMC
<b>GCOL</b>	Ground Collision	<b>UNK</b>	Unknown or Undetermined
<b>RAMP</b>	Ground Handling	<b>WILD</b>	Collision Wildlife
<b>ICE</b>	Icing	<b>WSTRW</b>	Wind Shear or Thunderstorm

Chart 9. CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT)

Each occurrence report received in the national database is categorised to allow for a top-level visibility of events. In order to select the correct category and reflect as closely as possible the event, ICAO and Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) resources are used, namely the document prepared by the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) ‘Aviation Occurrence Categories – Definitions and Usage Notes’.

These common taxonomies and definitions are intended to improve the aviation community’s capacity to focus on common safety issues. Chart 10 provides a snapshot of the ADREP categories reported in 2024 and 2025 and provides the basis for further analysis within that specific category as addressed in this document.




Chart 10. Occurrence categories in 2024 and 2025

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Chart 11 highlights the Top occurrence categories in 2025: BIRD, NAV, SEC, SCF-NP, RAMP and SCF-PP. These top occurrence categories will be analysed based on 2025 data.




Chart 11. Top occurrence categories in 2025

The concentration of occurrences within a limited number of categories (BIRD, NAV, SEC, SCF-NP, RAMP, SCF-PP) indicates that safety risks are clustered in specific operational and technical domains. This supports a targeted, risk-based approach to safety management and mitigation.

### Bird strikes (BIRD)

This category includes occurrences involving collisions or near-collisions with birds or other wildlife. Such events are largely influenced by the geographical location of the aerodrome and its surrounding environment.

As illustrated in Chart 10, a slight decrease in reported bird strike occurrences was observed in 2025 compared to 2024. A total of 165 bird strike occurrences were reported in 2024, while 150 occurrences were reported in 2025. Despite the relatively high number of occurrences in both years, none of the reported bird strike events resulted in aircraft damage in 2024 and 2025.

To support the analysis, bird strike occurrences are further categorised by location. In 2025, 98% of such occurrences were reported at the Zvartnots International Airport aerodrome, 1% at the Shirak Airport aerodrome, and 1% at foreign aerodromes, as illustrated in Chart 12.

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Bird strikes are recognised as a persistent operational hazard within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization Safety Management System (SMS). This hazard requires continuous safety risk management, including hazard identification, risk assessment, and the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures, particularly in the context of increasing air traffic and the resumption of air operations.



Chart 12. Bird strikes in different aerodromes in 2025

The strong concentration of bird strike occurrences at Zvartnots International Airport highlights a localized environmental risk. This indicates the need for targeted wildlife hazard management measures at this aerodrome.

### SEC - SECURITY RELATED:

Criminal/Security acts which result in accidents or incidents (per ICAO Annex 13). Intentional acts (suicide, homicide, acts of violence, self-inflicted injury, or laser attacks) are coded as SEC.

### Laser attacks



Laser attacks pose a significant risk to flight crew, as they may create hazardous visual effects, particularly during critical phases of flight such as take-off and approach/landing.

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In 2025, 25 occurrences of laser interference affecting aircraft were reported. This represents a decrease compared to previous years, with 75 occurrences reported in 2023 and 33 occurrences in 2024, as illustrated in Chart 13.




Chart 13. Laser attacks in 2023, 2024 and 2025

CAC established a working team from the relevant domains to analyse best practices and develop more practical regulations and guidance. Collaboration was strengthened between CAC and the local authorities in terms of educating the public to understand the significant safety impact caused by lasers. Chart 13 shows the number of occurrences related to Interference with aircraft in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

The decreasing trend in reported laser interference events suggests that mitigation measures, including public awareness and coordination with authorities, may be having a positive effect. Continued monitoring is required to ensure sustained reduction.

### System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant) (SCF-NP)

The analysis of technical occurrences for the reporting period shows a concentration of events within a limited number of ATA chapters, indicating targeted areas of concern rather than a widespread systemic issue.

The majority of occurrences are associated with **ATA Chapter 32 – Landing Gear**, primarily involving repeated nose wheel steering malfunctions, brake-related issues, and cases of damage identified post-flight. The recurrence of similar defects suggests potential reliability or maintenance-related shortcomings, as well as possible exposure to foreign object debris. Given the critical safety function of the landing gear system, this represents the most significant area of concern.

Occurrences related to **ATA Chapter 52 – Doors** form the second largest group and include both technical malfunctions and ground handling-related damage. These events point to a combination of equipment reliability considerations and the need for strengthened ramp handling practices. While not resulting in serious consequences, their potential impact on aircraft integrity and operations warrants attention.

Events involving **ATA Chapter 27–Flight Controls**, although fewer in number, remain operationally significant due to the critical nature of these systems. The reported issues required precautionary actions by flight crews, highlighting the importance of maintaining high reliability standards.

Other ATA chapters, including Electrical, Hydraulic, and Navigation systems, show low and non-repetitive occurrence rates, indicating no evident systemic concerns in these areas.

Overall, the data highlights the need to prioritize landing gear system reliability, enhance oversight of ground handling activities, and ensure the effectiveness of maintenance and inspection processes to prevent recurrence and improve early detection of defects.

The analysis of occurrences indicates that ATA 32 (Landing Gear) represents the most significant safety concern, accounting for approximately 27% of all events, with repeated nose wheel steering defects suggesting potential reliability or maintenance issues.


ATA 52 (Doors) and ATA 27 (Flight Controls) also show notable occurrence rates, involving both technical malfunctions and ground handling-related events.

The data highlights recurring themes related to component reliability, ground handling practices, and detection of defects during post-flight inspections.

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Corrective actions should prioritize landing gear system reliability, enhancement of ground handling procedures, and strengthening of inspection and reporting practices.



**Chart 14. System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non- Powerplant) (SCF-NP) (2025)**

The concentration of occurrences within specific ATA chapters, particularly landing gear, indicates localized technical reliability concerns rather than widespread system issues. This supports prioritization of targeted maintenance and oversight actions.

**System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant) (SCF-PP)**

The majority of SCF-PP occurrences are associated with ATA 72 (Engine), with additional contributions from ATA 80 (Starting), indicating a notable presence of engine start-related issues alongside core engine malfunctions.

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


Chart 15. System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant) (SCF-PP) (2025)

The review of SCF-PP (powerplant-related) occurrences shows a clear concentration of events within **ATA Chapter 72 – Engine**, which accounts for the majority of reported cases. These include engine failures, internal damage identified during inspection, and cases requiring engine shutdown. The nature of these events indicates that the primary risk exposure lies in the **core engine system**, including mechanical integrity and in-service reliability. The identification of internal damage during scheduled borescope inspection demonstrates that inspection processes are effective; however, it also suggests the presence of underlying degradation mechanisms, potentially linked to wear, operational conditions, or foreign object ingestion.

The dominance of engine-related occurrences highlights the critical importance of powerplant reliability in overall flight safety. The presence of starting system issues further indicates the need for focused maintenance attention on supporting engine systems.

A notable portion of occurrences is associated with **ATA Chapter 80 – Starting**, including multiple cases of inability to start engines and starter-related malfunctions. The recurrence of such events indicates a **pattern rather than isolated failures**, pointing to possible issues in starter system reliability, maintenance practices, or component lifecycle management. While these events typically occur on ground and have limited immediate safety impact, they contribute to operational disruptions and may indicate broader reliability concerns within the engine support systems.

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A single occurrence related to **ATA Chapter 36 – Pneumatic** (engine bleed faults) was identified and appears to be isolated, with no indication of a systemic issue in this area.

Overall, the data suggests that while the highest risk remains associated with engine core failures due to their potential severity, there is also a **developing trend in starting system malfunctions** that warrants attention. The combination of in-flight engine-related events and ground-based starting issues highlights the need for a balanced focus on both **engine health monitoring and supporting system reliability**.

It is recommended to initiate a **targeted reliability review of engine systems (ATA 72)**, with particular attention to recurring defects, component performance trends, and any indications of premature wear or foreign object damage. Maintenance data, including borescope inspection results, should be systematically analyzed to identify early warning signs and prevent in-service failures.

Given the repeated occurrences related to **engine starting (ATA 80)**, a focused assessment of starter systems should be conducted. This should include a review of maintenance procedures, component replacement intervals, and troubleshooting effectiveness to ensure that recurring faults are properly addressed and not repeatedly deferred or temporarily rectified.

In addition, consideration should be given to strengthening **preventive maintenance practices**, particularly for engine-associated systems, to enhance early detection of faults before they result in operational events. Continued monitoring of occurrence trends is essential to determine whether current patterns persist or evolve into more significant safety concerns.

## **5. EVENT TYPE**

### **Event Type**

Each occurrence under MOR system is assigned an event type, which supports occurrence reporting analysis by facilitating the identification of precursors and outcomes of events. The event-type classification is based on the ECCAIRS ADREP taxonomy and provides a comprehensive framework encompassing multiple domains and services.

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For simplicity, Chart 16 presents the seven top-tier event type categories for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025. It should be noted that a single occurrence may be assigned multiple event types.




Chart 16. Event Types in 2023, 2024 and 2025

Across all three years, the category “**Other events**” consistently represents the largest share of occurrences, indicating that a significant portion of events fall outside more specific classifications within the taxonomy. Although this category remains dominant, it shows a **peak in 2024 (215 occurrences)** followed by a **decline in 2025 (153 occurrences)**, suggesting some improvement in classification specificity or changes in reporting patterns.

The category “Other events” accounts for the largest share of reported occurrences across the reviewed period. While this category serves as a residual classification within the ECCAIRS/ADREP taxonomy, its high proportion reduces the level of analytical granularity and limits the identification of specific safety issues.

The predominance of “Other events” may indicate inconsistencies in taxonomy application, variations in reporting practices among organizations, or insufficient detail in occurrence descriptions to support more precise classification. It may also reflect a tendency to apply conservative or default categorisation where uncertainty exists.

From a safety risk management perspective, a high share of occurrences classified under “Other events” constrains the effectiveness of data-driven decision-making and trend analysis. Improving the accuracy and consistency of occurrence classification is therefore essential to enhance the overall quality of safety data.

Targeted actions, including focused training on taxonomy application, improved guidance material, and strengthened data quality assurance processes, would support a reduction in the use of this category and enable more effective identification of emerging safety risks.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> most prominent category is “**Equipment**”, which shows notable variability: a **decrease in 2024 (36 occurrences)** followed by a **sharp increase in 2025 (96 occurrences)**. This rebound may indicate either a rise in technical/equipment-related issues or improved detection and reporting of such events.

### **Trends by event type**

- **Consequential**

Very low frequency overall, with **2 occurrences in 2023 and none thereafter**, indicating that events with direct consequential outcomes are rare or better mitigated.

- **Operational**

A clear **upward trend** is observed: from **0 in 2023 to 19 in 2024 and 42 in 2025**. This suggests increasing reporting or a rise in operational-type occurrences, potentially reflecting higher operational complexity or improved reporting sensitivity.

- **Equipment**

Fluctuates significantly: **84 (2023) → 36 (2024) → 96 (2025)**. The sharp increase in 2025 is noteworthy and may warrant deeper investigation into maintenance practices, aging fleet effects, or reporting categorization.

- **Organizational**

Emerges only in **2025 (5 occurrences)**, which may indicate either newly identified organizational factors or improved recognition of systemic issues within the reporting framework.

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- **Personnel**

Remains consistently low: **8 (2023), 0 (2024), 5 (2025)**. This suggests relatively limited occurrence of human-factor-related reports, though underreporting cannot be excluded.

- **Unknown**

Minimal and declining: **8 (2023), 0 (2024), 4 (2025)**. The low numbers may indicate that most occurrences are being successfully classified, which reflects positively on data quality.

### **Key insights**

- The **dominance of “Other events”** suggests that further refinement of classification or better taxonomy mapping could improve analytical value.
- The **increase in operational and equipment-related events in 2025** may indicate either:
  - a real rise in such occurrences, or
  - improved reporting and classification practices.
- The **very low level of consequential events** is a positive safety indicator.
- The appearance of **organizational events in 2025** highlights increasing attention to systemic and organizational safety factors, consistent with modern Safety Management System (SMS) principles.
- The **reduction in unknown classifications** (relative stability and low values) indicates improving data quality and reporting precision.

From a safety management standpoint (aligned with ICAO SMS principles), the data suggests:

- A shift toward **better identification of underlying causal factors** (especially organizational and operational).
- A need to **further reduce the “Other events” category** to improve analytical granularity.
- Continued monitoring of **equipment-related occurrences**, given their variability and potential safety impact.

The observed increase in equipment-related occurrences in 2025 is consistent with the trends identified in the occurrence category analysis, particularly within System/Component Failure or Malfunction (SCF-NP and SCF-PP) categories. These include recurring issues associated with ATA Chapter 32 (Landing Gear), ATA Chapter 72 (Engine), and ATA Chapter 80 (Starting Systems).

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This alignment indicates that equipment-related events are not isolated but reflect underlying technical reliability and maintenance-related risks. As such, these occurrences should be considered a key contributor to the overall safety risk profile.

From a safety management perspective, this trend reinforces the need to prioritise:

- enhanced maintenance oversight and reliability monitoring,
- targeted analysis of recurring defects within critical ATA chapters,
- and strengthened preventive maintenance and inspection practices.

Consequently, equipment-related occurrences should be explicitly integrated into the national safety risk priorities and addressed through targeted mitigation actions in line with ICAO SMS principles.

## 6. INVESTIGATION

Certain occurrences, while meeting the criteria for reportable events, are adequately addressed by the reporting organization. In such cases, there is no justification for further investigation by CAC. However, the details of the occurrence and the corrective actions taken provide valuable information for dissemination and data retention purposes.

These occurrences are classified as “Closed on Receipt.” In 2025, the CAC classified 299 occurrences as “Closed on Receipt,” as illustrated in Chart 17, and opened 6 occurrences for expert review.




Chart 17. Investigation status

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## **Investigation Criteria and Risk-Based Approach**

The decision to classify occurrences as “Closed on Receipt” or to open them for expert review is based on a risk-based assessment aligned with ICAO Annex 13 principles and SMS methodology.

Occurrences are generally classified as “Closed on Receipt” when:

- the event is assessed as low severity with no significant safety impact,
- the root cause is clearly identified and adequately addressed by the reporting organization,
- no systemic safety issues or recurring trends are identified,
- and sufficient information is available to support closure without further investigation.

Conversely, occurrences are subject to expert review when one or more of the following criteria are met:

- potential high-risk or high-severity safety impact,
- uncertainty regarding root causes or contributing factors,
- indication of recurring defects or emerging trends,
- involvement of critical aircraft systems (e.g., engine, flight controls, landing gear),
- or the need for independent validation of the investigation conducted by the reporting entity.

This approach ensures that investigative resources are proportionately allocated based on risk, while maintaining effective oversight of safety-critical occurrences and emerging hazards.

Occurrences assigned the status “Open for Expert Review” remain under examination by the relevant departments or are subject to joint consideration with the reporting organisation and other involved stakeholders.

Such cases require additional analysis, data validation, or expert assessment in order to establish a final conclusion and determine appropriate corrective actions. These processes may require a considerable amount of time, particularly when complex technical, operational, or organisational factors are involved.

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## **7. SAFETY RISK PRIORITIES FOR 2025**

The safety risk priorities for 2025 have been identified through analysis of occurrence data, taking into account both frequency and potential severity, as well as alignment with the European Plan for Aviation Safety and global safety priorities defined by ICAO. Risk levels are determined based on a combination of occurrence frequency and potential severity in accordance with Safety Management System principles.

Based on the analysis of the comparison of the occurrences in 2025 the following safety risk priorities are identified:

### **1. Bird Strike Risk Management (BIRD)**

Bird strike occurrences continue to represent the most significant safety issue in terms of frequency and are therefore assessed as a high-level risk. Although these events did not result in aircraft damage during the reporting period, their persistent occurrence and strong concentration at Zvartnots International Airport indicate a localized environmental hazard that requires continuous and targeted mitigation. In line with EASA priorities, this risk is directly associated with aerodrome operations and environmental management.

### **2. Navigation and Operational Factors (NAV / Operational Events)**

Although individual navigation and operational occurrences are assessed as low risk in terms of severity, their high frequency indicates a significant concentration of events within critical flight operations domains. In 2025, 54 navigation-related occurrences and 42 operational events were recorded. From a safety management perspective, such repeated low-severity events represent important precursors and may indicate underlying systemic or operational weaknesses. In line with the principles of ICAO and EASA, this results in an aggregated risk level assessed as medium to high, requiring continued monitoring, analysis, and targeted mitigation actions.

Although technical failures have higher individual severity, navigation and operational occurrences are ranked as a higher priority due to their significantly greater frequency and their role as direct precursors to major accident categories. In accordance with ICAO and EASA risk assessment principles, this results in a higher aggregated system-level risk.

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### **3. Technical Failures – System/Component Reliability (SCF-NP & SCF-PP)**

The most recurrent technical occurrences are associated with ATA Chapter 32 (Landing Gear), where repeated defects, particularly nose wheel steering and braking issues, represent the most critical technical risk area. Engine-related occurrences (ATA 72) involve failures and internal damage with high severity potential, while events related to engine starting systems (ATA 80) indicate recurring reliability and maintenance concerns.

Technical failures related to system and component reliability are assessed as a high-risk priority due to their potential severity. The analysis shows a clear concentration of occurrences within specific ATA chapters, particularly landing gear systems, engine systems, and engine starting systems. While not all such occurrences result in serious outcomes, their potential impact on flight safety, especially in the case of engine-related events, necessitates continued focus on maintenance quality, reliability monitoring, and early detection of defects. This risk area is fully consistent with EASA's emphasis on aircraft system reliability and continuing airworthiness.

### **4. Equipment-Related Occurrences**

Equipment-related occurrences are assessed as a medium to high-level risk, reflecting the significant increase observed in 2025. This trend appears to be closely linked to technical failures and may reflect both improved reporting practices and underlying reliability concerns.

From a safety management perspective, further analysis is required to determine whether this increase represents a genuine rise in risk or improved visibility of existing issues.

### **5. Security-Related Events (Laser Interference)**

Security-related events involving laser interference are assessed as a medium-level safety risk. Although the number of occurrences shows a decreasing trend and no safety-critical consequences were recorded, these events occur during critical phases of flight and have the potential to impair flight crew performance.

In line with ICAO and EASA considerations of external threats, continued monitoring and mitigation remain necessary.

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## **6. Ground Handling and Ramp Operations (RAMP / ATA 52 – Doors)**

Ground handling and ramp-related occurrences, including events associated with aircraft doors (ATA 52), are assessed as a low-level safety risk due to their limited frequency. While these events are typically of low severity and do not pose a direct threat to flight safety, they may indicate isolated weaknesses in ground handling practices and human performance. Continued monitoring and targeted training remain appropriate to prevent recurrence.

## **7. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the analysis of occurrence reports, a set of safety recommendations has been identified. These recommendations are aligned with the safety priorities of the EASA as defined in the EPAS 2025 and reflect a risk-based approach consistent with modern Safety Management System principles.

### **1. Bird Strike Mitigation**

- Enhance wildlife hazard management programs at aerodromes, particularly Zvartnots.
- Strengthen coordination between aerodrome operators and environmental authorities.
- Implement data-driven wildlife control measures and continuous monitoring.

Bird strike mitigation remains a key priority due to the high frequency of such occurrences. It is recommended to further enhance wildlife hazard management programmes at aerodromes, with particular focus on Zvartnots International Airport, where the majority of events are concentrated. Strengthening coordination between aerodrome operators and environmental authorities is essential to ensure effective and sustainable mitigation measures. In addition, the implementation of data-driven wildlife control strategies and continuous monitoring should be reinforced. These actions are fully consistent with EPAS priorities addressing aerodrome safety and environmental hazards.

### **2. Technical Reliability Improvements**

- Conduct targeted reliability reviews of landing gear (ATA 32) and engine systems (ATA 72).
- Enhance preventive maintenance programs and early defect detection methods.
- Improve analysis and use of maintenance data (e.g., borescope inspections).

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Improving technical reliability represents another critical area for safety enhancement. Targeted reliability reviews should be conducted for key systems, particularly landing gear (ATA Chapter 32) and engine systems (ATA Chapter 72), where recurrent issues have been identified. Preventive maintenance programmes should be further strengthened, with increased emphasis on early detection of defects through enhanced inspection methods, including the systematic use of maintenance data such as borescope inspection results. These measures are aligned with EASA's focus on continuing airworthiness, maintenance quality, and data-driven safety management.

### **3. Engine Starting System Oversight**

- Review maintenance procedures and component lifecycle management for ATA 80 systems.
- Address recurring defects through root cause analysis rather than repetitive corrective actions.

In relation to engine starting systems (ATA Chapter 80), specific attention should be given to improving maintenance procedures and component lifecycle management. The recurrence of starting-related malfunctions indicates the need for more effective root cause analysis, rather than repeated short-term corrective actions. This approach is consistent with EPAS principles promoting systematic identification and resolution of underlying safety issues.

### **4. Ground Handling Safety Enhancements**

- Strengthen training programs for ground handling personnel.
- Introduce stricter oversight and standardization of ramp procedures.
- Promote reporting and analysis of ground damage events.

Ground handling and ramp operations, while assessed as lower risk, still require targeted safety improvements. Strengthening training programmes for ground handling personnel, enhancing oversight, and promoting the standardisation of ramp procedures will contribute to reducing the likelihood of damage-related occurrences. Increased emphasis on reporting and analysing ground damage events will further support proactive risk management. These actions are in line with EPAS priorities related to aerodrome and ground operations safety.

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## **5. Reduction of Equipment-Related Occurrences**

- Monitor trends in equipment-related events to distinguish between reporting improvements and actual risk increases.
- Enhance maintenance quality assurance and inspection practices.

The increase in equipment-related occurrences observed in 2025 highlights the need for continued monitoring and analysis. It is recommended to further assess whether this trend reflects an actual increase in technical risk or improved reporting practices.

Enhancing maintenance quality assurance processes and inspection practices will support early identification of defects and improve overall system reliability. This approach aligns with EASA's Safety Risk Management framework, which emphasises trend analysis and proportionate mitigation.

## **6. Mitigation of Laser Attacks**

- Continue public awareness campaigns on the dangers of laser interference.
- Strengthen cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
- Consider additional regulatory or enforcement measures if necessary.

Mitigation of laser interference events should continue through sustained public awareness campaigns highlighting the risks associated with laser use near aircraft. Strengthening cooperation with law enforcement authorities remains essential to prevent such occurrences and ensure appropriate enforcement measures.

Where necessary, consideration should be given to additional regulatory actions. Although not a standalone priority within EPAS, such external threats are addressed within broader operational safety and stakeholder engagement activities promoted by European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

## **7. Improvement of Data Quality and Classification**

- Reduce reliance on the "Other events" category through improved taxonomy application.
- Promote consistent and accurate occurrence classification among reporting entities.

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Improving data quality and occurrence classification remains a fundamental enabler of effective safety management. Efforts should be made to reduce reliance on the “Other events” category through improved application of taxonomy and enhanced guidance for reporting entities. Promoting consistent and accurate classification will increase the analytical value of occurrence data and support more precise identification of safety risks. This recommendation is directly aligned with EPAS priorities related to data quality and evidence-based decision-making.

## **8. Strengthening Safety Culture**

- Continue promoting “Just Culture” principles to encourage reporting.
- Enhance training on safety reporting and occurrence analysis across all stakeholders.

Finally, continued strengthening of safety culture across the aviation sector is essential. The promotion of Just Culture principles should remain a priority in order to encourage open and transparent reporting. In parallel, training programmes on occurrence reporting and safety analysis should be enhanced for all stakeholders. These actions support the development of a mature Safety Management System and are fully consistent with the strategic objectives of both International Civil Aviation Organization and European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

## **9. ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES**

In 2024, **AASIID** circulated five Safety Information Bulletins (SIBs) issued by **EASA** to the Civil Aviation Committee (CAC). These SIBs included recommendations aimed at enhancing aviation safety through the implementation of improved procedures.

In 2025, the dissemination of safety information was further expanded, with 30 safety information documents circulated from multiple sources, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations, various accident investigation authorities, and, where deemed necessary, the European Central Repository of Safety Recommendations, to relevant aviation organizations, thereby promoting a proactive safety management approach across the aviation sector.

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The safety information documents are also published on the website of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure

<https://mtad.am/pages/accident-prevention>

AASIID monitors responses to the implementation of safety recommendations where applicable. However, AASIID is not responsible for the physical implementation of these measures. The ultimate responsibility lies with the addressees of the recommendations, particularly CAC, which possesses enforcement authority. It is the regulator's duty to verify acceptance and practical implementation of safety recommendations through audits, inspections, and oversight activities.

## **10. CONCLUSION**

In 2025, the civil aviation system of the Republic of Armenia continued to demonstrate positive safety performance, underpinned by a positive reporting culture and improved data quality. The observed increase in occurrence reporting is primarily attributed to enhanced reporting culture, improved regulatory framework, and increased operational activity, rather than a deterioration in safety performance. This is consistent with best practices promoted by ICAO and EASA.

Key safety priorities identified include bird strikes, technical system reliability, equipment-related events, and operational factors. The absence of fatalities and injuries, combined with the very low number of high-severity events, demonstrates that the aviation system continues to operate within an acceptable level of safety performance. Existing safety barriers and risk controls appear to be effective in preventing the escalation of occurrences into accidents or serious incidents.

At the same time, the analysis indicates that safety risks are concentrated in specific domains rather than being systemic. The most prominent areas include bird strikes, technical system reliability, equipment-related events, ground handling operations, and certain operational factors. These findings are consistent with trends identified at the European and global levels by both EASA and ICAO, where similar risk areas continue to dominate safety analyses.

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In comparison with European and global safety data, the Armenian aviation system demonstrates a comparable pattern, characterized by a high proportion of low-severity occurrences, increasing reliance on data-driven safety management, and a growing focus on technical reliability and operational performance. Bird strikes, in particular, remain a persistent hazard both nationally and internationally, requiring continuous management within the broader context of aerodrome safety.

Looking ahead, further improvements in safety performance will depend on continued enhancement of data quality, particularly through more precise occurrence classification and a reduction in the “Other events” category. Strengthening the use of Safety Performance Indicators, implementing targeted mitigation measures in key risk areas, and maintaining alignment with European and international frameworks will be essential.

The successful transposition of **EU Reg. 376/2014** into national legislation, alongside the promotion of **‘Just Culture’ principles**, has enabled more comprehensive safety analysis based on operational data. Comparative statistical analyses produced by **AASIID** have provided valuable insights to guide audits, oversight, and targeted mitigation measures.

Moving forward, continued implementation of recommended accident prevention measures, sustained promotion of safety reporting, and alignment with **European and international safety frameworks (ICAO and EASA)** will be essential for maintaining and enhancing Armenia’s high safety performance. Strengthened collaboration between the CAC, AASIID, and industry stakeholders will ensure that safety recommendations translate into concrete actions, supported by regular monitoring and enforcement.

As the Armenian aviation sector grows, embedding a culture of continuous improvement and proactive risk management remains critical. The progress achieved in 2024–2025 provides a solid foundation for further enhancements, reinforcing transparency, accountability, and effective safety analysis, and contributing to a safer and more resilient civil aviation system for all stakeholders.

AASIID remains committed to fostering transparency, accountability, and effective safety analysis, contributing to a safer and more resilient civil aviation system for all stakeholders.

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